State of Utah v. Elizabeth M. DeSeelhorst : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
State of Utah v. Elizabeth M. DeSeelhorst : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Christopher Bown; Deputy District Attorney; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Rodney R. Parker; Richard A. Van Wagoner; Frederick Mark Gedicks; Snow, Christensen &
Martineau; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. DeSeelhorst, No. 20060221 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6327
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
ELIZABETH M. DESEELHORST, 
DEFEND ANT/APPELLANT. 
CASE NO. 20060221-
DISTRICT CT. NO. 051400059 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN 
CHRISTOPHER BOWN 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84088 
TELEPHONE: (801)468-3422 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
RODNEY R. PARKER 
RICHARD A. VAN WAGONER 
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE: (801)521-9000 
FILED 
Attorneys for Defendant/App&farftppEmjE COURTS 
JAN 1 7 2007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, ; 
v. ; 
ELIZABETH M. DESEELHORST, ; 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. ; 
) CASE No. 20060221 
) DISTRICT CT. No. 051400059 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE ROYAL I. HANSEN 
CHRISTOPHER BOWN 
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84088 
TELEPHONE: (801)468-3422 
RODNEY R. PARKER 
RICHARD A. VAN WAGONER 
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145-5000 
TELEPHONE: (801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. APPELLANT CITED AND DISCUSSED ALL EVIDENCE 
NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S 
MARSHALING REQUIREMENT 2 
A. In her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict, Mrs. DeSeelhorst cited and discussed all 
required evidence 2 
B. In her argument that Dr. Foley's unrebutted testimony 
constituted a reasonable alternative hypothesis, Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst cited and discussed all required evidence 5 
II. MERE FAILURE TO AVOID A THREATENED ACCIDENT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 7 
III. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT AT TRIAL THAT THE ACCIDENT 
WAS THE RESULT OF CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT RATHER 
THAN INTENTIONAL CONDUCT IS INHERENTLY 
IMPROBABLE AND SUBJECT TO REASONABLE DOUBT AS 
A MATTER OF LAW 13 
CONCLUSION 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Chenv. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 .......3 
Hatcher v. State, 230 Miss. 257, 92 So.2d 552 (1957) 9 
People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 592, 555 N.E. 253 (1990) 7, 11 
State v. Clark, 188 Utah 517, 223 P.2d 184 (1950) 10 
State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 999 P.2d 1252 1,11 
State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948) 8, 9 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 4 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 85 (1999) 2 
-ii-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's contention that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to marshal the evidence is a 
desperate sleight of hand apparently designed to avoid the necessity of confronting the 
State's failure to prove that the accident in question was the result of criminal negligence. 
Nothing in the State's marshaling arguments provides any affirmative insight into what 
precisely the State contends Mrs. DeSeelhorst was doing immediately prior to the acci-
dent that was "reckless[] or with an indifference to human life," State v. Larsen, 2000 UT 
App 106 ffl 20-21, 999 P.2d 1252, so as to raise her level of culpability beyond ordinary 
negligence. 
Instead, the State resorts to incomplete descriptions of the record and advocacy of 
what can only be described as fantastic inferences from the evidence. It advocates con-
clusions, such as that Mrs. DeSeelhorst applied her brakes, which directly contradict its 
position at trial, and then takes Mrs. DeSeelhorst to task for not advocating such contra-
dictions herself. It does not fairly or accurately portray the marshaling of evidence that 
was presented in Mrs. DeSeelhorst's brief. Most egregiously, it presents incomplete and 
unreliable references to the record which, upon fair examination, do not support the 
propositions for which they are cited. 
The search in this case is for evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was impaired or dis-
tracted, or had been driving recklessly or erratically prior to the accident, in order to sup-
port a conclusion that her actions were not merely negligent, but criminal. Criminally 
negligent homicide entails "such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordi-
narily prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a 
proper regard for human life or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indiffer-
ence to consequences." 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 85 p. 549 (1999). While the State 
works the fringes of appellant's arguments, it never answers the simple question: Given 
the State's concession that Mrs. DeSeelhorst did not intentionally run down the cyclist, 
what distinguishes Mrs. DeSeelhorst's operation of her vehicle from ordinary negligence 
and renders it criminal? While Dr. Foley's testimony provides an answer to that ques-
tion, this case is really about the failure of proof evident from the State's failure to pro-
vide an answer to the question. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT CITED AND DISCUSSED ALL EVIDENCE NEC-
ESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THIS COURT'S MARSHALING 
REQUIREMENT. 
A. In her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict, Mrs. DeSeelhorst cited and discussed all 
required evidence. 
The State argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to marshal evidence relating to four 
actual or potential facts that it says supported the finding of criminal negligence. First, 
the State argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to marshal evidence showing the inconsis-
tencies in her testimony about whether or not she saw Ms. Johnson prior to the accident. 
Brief of Appellee, at 9-10. This is simply wrong. Both Mrs. DeSeelhorst's Statement of 
Facts and her argument in the body of her opening brief clearly state that she made con-
tradictory statements, and gave detailed citations to the record. See Brief of Appellant, at 
4, 10 f (2); see also id., at 9 n.3 (summarizing prosecutor's opening statement at trial that 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst saw Ms. Johnson immediately prior to the accident). Similarly, the 
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State argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to mention that there were two uphill travel 
lanes on the section of the highway road where the accident occurred, see Brief of Appel-
lee, at 10, yet this fact is clearly disclosed in Mrs. DeSeelhorst's statement that "she was 
driving in the right hand lane of travel when the road split into two uphill lanes," see 
Brief of Appellant, at 3, and that the accident occurred near the fog line. 
Second, the State argues that because Mrs. DeSeelhorst's car "came to a stop in 
the middle of the road," and followed a straight line after the accident, she must have ap-
plied her brakes to come to a controlled stop, Brief of Appellant, at 9. The evidentiary 
fact is that the car traveled uphill in a straight line partially onto the unpaved shoulder, 
back onto the roadway, and almost into the opposing downhill lane, where it came to rest. 
(R. 152 pp. 214-22.) There is no evidence regarding braking and indeed, contrary to its 
argument on appeal, the State argued to the jury in both its opening and closing state-
ments that Mrs. DeSeelhorst did not apply her brakes (R. 152, p. 142; R. 154 p. 534; see 
Brief of Appellant, at 9 n.3, 10 n.4), and Mrs. DeSeelhorst did not dispute that argument. 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst is not required to marshal evidence to challenge facts that were 
undisputed at trial and were advanced by the prosecution on numerous occasions. Her 
marshaling obligation is to "demonstrate how the [jury] found the facts from the evidence 
and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the evidence." Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82 f 22, 100 P.3d 1177. Although the jury's verdict is entitled to def-
erence on appeal, surely that deference does not include assuming that the jury found 
against a fact that the State affirmatively argued and that the defendant did not dispute. 
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The only reasonable assumption when a fact is undisputed is that the jury's verdict rested 
on that fact, and not on its negation. 
Third, the State argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to marshal evidence that she 
turned her car along the curve of the road prior to the accident. Brief of Appellant, at 9. 
The State, however, gives no clue what this evidence is or where it can be found. Noth-
ing in the State's Statement of Facts identifies such evidence, see Brief of Appellant, at 3-
6, and the State provided no record citation in support of its later argument that Mrs. De-
Seelhorst failed to marshal such evidence, see id. at 9. In fact, the physical evidence at 
trial showed that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle traveled in a straight line before, during, and 
after the accident. (R. 153 pp. 469-70, 482, 486.) Mrs. DeSeelhorst cannot be charged 
with failing to marshal non-existent evidence that the State itself does not identify and lo-
cate. Cf. Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("There is, in ef-
fect, no need for an appellant to marshal the evidence when the findings are so inadequate 
that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as factual determinations."). 
Finally, the State argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst did not marshal her own testimony 
that she always drove on the right side of the road, and that this might have explained 
why she took no evasive action prior to the accident. Brief of Appellee, at 9. The State is 
apparently suggesting that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's commitment to drive in the right-hand lane 
was so strong that she knowingly and intentionally ran down Ms. Johnson rather than 
change lanes, and that this compulsion supports the verdict of criminally negligent homi-
cide. This "explanation" is not only ludicrous, it is inconsistent with the State's charge, 
and the jury's verdict, that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was guilty of criminally negligent rather 
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than reckless or intentional conduct. Mrs. DeSeelhorst should not be required to marshal 
evidence that is inconsistent with the state's charge and the jury's verdict on that charge. 
B. In her argument that Dr. Foley's unrebutted testimony consti-
tuted a reasonable alternative hypothesis, Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
cited and discussed all required evidence. 
The State does not accurately describe Dr. Foley's testimony and overlooks most 
of the evidence that Mrs. DeSeelhorst marshaled in connection with Dr. Foley's testi-
mony. Dr. Foley testified that there was "no question" that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was "at 
very high risk of having suffered a recurrent small stroke, mini-stroke, or a partial com-
plex seizure which would have rendered her unable to take appropriate action at a critical 
juncture." (R. 153 p. 469.) He explained that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's MRI shows multiple 
lesions on her brain which Dr. Foley opined were evidence of "transient ischemic at-
tacks," also called "mini strokes" or "TIAs," which have resulted from blood clots break-
ing loose from a mitral heart valve implant. (R. 153 pp. 443, 455-57.) Those lesions 
render those regions of her brain more "epileptogenic," or in other words they heighten 
the risk for "partial complex seizures" in those areas. (R. 153 pp. 457, 447-49.) He testi-
fied that, "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty . . . she suffered a probably rea-
sonably brief but critical lapse in consciousness for a short period of time." (R. 153 
pp. 469-70.) 
The State's marshaling claims do not go to the heart of Dr. Foley's testimony, and 
they are not accurate. The State argues, for example, that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to note 
that Dr. Foley could not specify the medical condition that would have caused the brain 
lesions he observed in the MRIs. The State's citation to the record, however, is not reli-
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able. Dr. Foley was able to specify the medical condition: He testified that the lesions 
were caused by transient ischemic attacks. He also testified that the brief lapse of con-
sciousness at the moment of the accident was caused by either a TIA or by a partial com-
plex seizure. What he could not do is choose between those two explanations because 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst was not connected to laboratory equipment at that moment. 
I think that there was an event which occurred which transiently rendered 
her without ability to process—a kind of visual and everything—all the 
other kinds of signals coming at her, as a driver. Whether that was a brief 
partial seizure or a transient ischemic attach to the consciousness center or a 
seizure as a result of a transient ischemic attack, I cannot tell you for cer-
tain. 
Q. So you don't know whether it was a partial—I mean, you just 
can't say for certain which it was. 
A. No. We would have to have her wired up in the car or we— 
you know, theoretically, we can do that in an elaborately controlled labora-
tory situation. But obviously, there's no—there's no data like that available 
to us for this—this episode. (R. 153 pp. 477-78.) 
The State also argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to marshal evidence that Dr. 
Foley could not date the neurological abnormalities evident in the two MRIs he compared 
in formulating his testimony, see Brief of Appellee, at 10-11, yet this evidence is clearly 
described and cited in Brief of Appellant, at 20 \ (ii). The State argues that Mrs. DeSeel-
horst failed to note that Dr. Foley relied on her self-reported and self-contradicted testi-
mony in formulating his opinion, see Brief of Appellant, at 11, yet this evidence is clearly 
described and cited in Brief of Appellant, at 20 \ (iii), 21 \ (ii). In fact, the contradictory 
nature of her statements forms part of the basis for his opinion: "[I]t has a couple of time 
points in it and is not really, to me, what really truly happened. And it wouldn't be that 
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inconsistent with someone who doesn't really know exactly what happened and is trying 
to put down something." (R. 153 p. 480.) Finally, the State argues that Mrs. DeSeelhorst 
failed to marshal the inconsistency between Dr. Foley's testimony that "mini strokes" or 
other such "neurological events" may last as little as 15 seconds or as long as a minute 
and a half, and police officer testimony that there were only a few seconds in which such 
a neurological event could have occurred, see Brief of Appellee, at 11, yet, once again, 
this evidence is clearly described and cited in Brief of Appellant, at 10 \ (2), 19. 
In sum, the evidence that the State contends Mrs. DeSeelhorst failed to marshal in 
support of both of her arguments was properly marshaled in her brief. The few remaining 
pieces of evidence mentioned by the State are either unrelated to the jury's verdict, or 
unidentified by the State. 
II. MERE FAILURE TO AVOID A THREATENED ACCIDENT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE. 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst argued in her brief that in Utah and other jurisdictions proof of 
criminal negligence requires evidence of blameworthy conduct beyond a mere failure to 
avoid the accident. See Brief of Appellant, at 12-15. The State did not respond to this 
argument.1 When the evidence in this case is measured against the evidence of blame-
worthy conduct which has in prior cases been held to satisfy the standard of criminal neg-
1
 Curiously, the State quotes People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692, 555 N.E.2d 253, 254 
(1990), for the standard definition of criminal negligence, see Brief of Appellee, at 13, 
but fails to quote or otherwise discuss the most important qualification to Boutin's defini-
tion, that "unless a defendant has engaged in some blameworthy conduct creating or con-
tributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, he has not committed the crime 
of criminal negligence." 75 N.Y.2d at 696, 555 N.E.2d at 255, quoted in Brief of Appel-
lant, at 12. 
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ligence, it is apparent that the state has failed to identify the blameworthy conduct and 
that the conviction cannot stand. 
The State's theory of criminal negligence is that Mrs. DeSeelhorst saw Ms. John-
son bicycling in her lane several seconds before the accident, and did not take steps to 
avoid hitting her. See Brief of Appellee, at 14 ("Defendant was traveling on a curved 
road and when she observed a vehicle traveling lawfully in her lane of travel, she refused 
to change lanes to pass the slower moving vehicle."); id. at 15 ("[T]he Defendant saw the 
vehicle with which she collided, and drove in a way as to not avoid running down the 
slower vehicle from behind."). The decisions cited by the State in support of its theory of 
criminal negligence, however, actually support Mrs. DeSeelhorst's position that proof of 
criminal negligence requires evidence of blameworthy conduct beyond failure to avoid 
the accident itself. 
The only Utah decision cited by the State in direct support of its theory of criminal 
negligence is State v. Riddle, 112 Utah 356, 188 P.2d 449 (1948), an involuntary man-
slaughter case decided at common law more than half a century ago. The State cites Rid-
dle for the proposition that allowing one's vehicle to travel outside of its lane while fol-
lowing a curve, and failing to see another vehicle, necessarily constitutes criminal negli-
gence, and then argues this as authority for its conclusion that Mrs. DeSeelhorst was 
criminally negligent in allowing her vehicle to drift outside the travel lane, and failing to 
avoid hitting Ms. Johnson, whom Mrs. DeSeelhorst had actually seen. See Brief of Ap-
pellee, at 14. 
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The Riddle case, however, does not rely on the defendant's mere failure to see the 
oncoming car. Rather, the Riddle defendant, on a "dangerous" or possibly "blind" curve 
where it was not possible to see whether there was oncoming traffic, drove into the lane 
of oncoming traffic without ascertaining whether the lane was clear. 112 Utah at 364, 
188 P.2d at 453. This was plainly a gross deviation from the standard of care and created 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or injury, and thus satisfied the mens rea for 
the crime: 
Whether or not it is criminal negligence to drive an automobile in 
such a manner that all or part of it extends over the center line of a highway 
must necessarily depend upon all of the surrounding circumstances. We do 
not say that in every case it is criminal negligence for a driver to permit part 
of his vehicle to project over the center line and onto the left hand side of 
the highway. Under some circumstances such conduct might not amount to 
criminal negligence. But where a driver enters a blind curve in the dark-
ness of the night, and permits his automobile to get onto the left side of the 
road, and fails to see an automobile approaching in a lawful manner from 
the opposite direction, reasonable minds not only might fairly conclude that 
he was guilty of "reckless conduct or conduct evincing a marked disregard 
for the safety of others" but could hardly conclude otherwise. 
112 Utah at 364, 188 P.2d at 453. 
The other decision cited by the State in support of its theory of criminal negli-
gence, Hatcher v. State, 230 Miss. 257, 92 So.2d 552 (1957), likewise supports the re-
quirement of blameworthy conduct beyond' the accident itself. The State contends that 
Hatcher's affirmance of defendant's conviction for "culpable negligence" is persuasive 
authority for upholding Mrs. DeSeelhorst's conviction, because immediately before the 
accident the Hatcher defendant saw the victim riding his bicycle in defendant's lane and 
made no effort to avoid hitting him. See Brief of Appellee, at 15-16. The State neglects 
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to mention, however, that the Hatcher defendant was traveling well over the speed 
limit—between 75 and 90 miles per hour—and that just before the accident the defendant 
had been blowing his horn and looking off the roadway in an attempt to attract a by-
stander's attention. 230 Miss, at 259, 92 So.2d at 553. 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst was not engaging in any such blameworthy conduct at the time 
that she struck Ms. Johnson; to the contrary, Mrs. DeSeelhorst was traveling five to ten 
miles per hour under the speed limit, and there is no evidence whatsoever that she was 
engaged in voluntary conduct or actions that would have distracted her attention from her 
driving immediately prior to the accident. The curve where Mrs. DeSeelhorst struck Ms. 
Johnson was not a section of highway that was dangerous or required special care, Mrs. 
DeSeelhorst was traveling with the flow of traffic at the time the accident occurred, not 
against it, and nothing about Mrs. DeSeelhorst's driving at the time of the accident was 
otherwise blameworthy.2 
2
 The State also cites State v. Clark, 188 Utah 517, 223 P.2d 184 (1950), another dated 
common law decision, though not in support of its argument that Mrs. DeSeelhorst's fail-
ure to avoid hitting Ms. Johnson after seeing her constituted criminal negligence. See 
Brief of Appellee, at 17 (suggesting that the jury's determination of criminal negligence 
must be upheld because criminal negligence is a "community standard of care" based on 
all of the evidence). Clark, however, actually supports Mrs. DeSeelhorst's contention 
that criminal negligence requires evidence of blameworthy conduct beyond failure to 
avoid an accident. In Clark, the defendant lost control of his vehicle and crossed the cen-
ter line into oncoming traffic, striking an oncoming car and causing a fatal injury to one 
of his passengers. The court upheld the jury verdict, pointing to evidence that the defen-
dant was going too fast, given the icy condition of the highway and the presence of other 
vehicles, and was carrying nine passengers in a five- or six-passenger car. 118 Utah at 
519, 528, 519, 223 P.2d 185, 189. Once again, none of this evidence of blameworthiness 
is present in the instant case. 
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The State cannot satisfy the requirement of blameworthy conduct with the asser-
tion that Mrs. DeSeelhorst "cut the corner" of the highway prior to the accident, because 
it is inconsistent with the State's claim that Mrs. DeSeelhorst saw the cyclist yet acted 
without intent. It is also undisputed that the accident occurred well within the roadway, 
not on the shoulder (Ex P-22; R. 152 pp. 187-88, 206-08, 220, 224, 231-33; R. 153 
p. 294), so Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle would still have struck Ms. Johnson even if all of 
the vehicle had been in the travel lane and inside of the fog line. "Cutting the corner" 
was not a cause of the accident. Evidence of blameworthy conduct that does not contrib-
ute to an accident cannot be used to support a conviction for criminally negligent homi-
cide. See State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106 f 20, 999 P.2d 1257 (holding evidence that 
defendant had been drinking prior to fatal collision, did not have his headlights on, and 
did not use his turn signal could not be used to support trial court finding of defendant's 
criminal negligence, "[b]ecause there is no nexus between the collision and the presence 
of alcohol, the absence of headlights, or [the] inactivated turn signal"). 
Reduced to its essence, the State's argument is that criminal negligence is present 
if the defendant saw the victim immediately before the accident, and absent if the defen-
dant did not see the victim before the accident. See Brief of Appellant, at 14 (arguing 
that Mrs. DeSeelhorst cannot rely on Larsen because the Larsen defendant "did not see 
an coming vehicle when he turned in front of it" and was guilty of "[mjere inattentive-
ness," whereas Mrs. DeSeelhorst stated that "she saw a bicyclist 150 feet in front of 
her"); id. at 15 (arguing that People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 592, 555 N.E. 253 (1990), is 
distinguishable because the Boutin "defendant did not see the vehicle he collided with," 
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whereas Mrs. DeSeelhorst "saw the bicycle ahead of her"); id. at 16 (arguing that 
Hatcher is persuasive authority because both the Hatcher defendant and Mrs. DeSeel-
horst saw their victims prior to their respective accidents). 
That is not the law, in Utah or in any other jurisdiction. Mere failure to avoid an 
accident does not constitute criminal negligence in the absence of evidence of blamewor-
thy conduct, even when the defendant sees the victim prior to the accident. See Brief of 
Appellant, at 12-15. Mrs. DeSeelhorst's conduct must be measured against the conduct 
of the defendants in the other cited cases in which criminal negligence was found: Rid-
dle, where the defendant drove around a blind corner on the wrong side of the road; Boss, 
where the defendant was speeding and executing a dangerous pass into the path of on-
coming traffic so recklessly that she overcorrected upon returning to her lane; Hatcher, 
where the defendant was traveling between 75 and 90 miles per hour while attempting to 
catch the attention of a pedestrian; and Clark, where the defendant was driving too fast 
for icy conditions with nine passengers in his car. 
In contrast, in the cases of inadvertence or inattention, where no aggressive driv-
ing, speeding, undue risk-taking, intoxication, or other gross negligence was present, the 
convictions were found not to be supported by the evidence and were reversed. While 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst may have been negligent in failing to avoid the accident at issue in this 
case, the State's failure to adduce any evidence of blameworthy conduct beyond her not 
avoiding the accident prevents her negligence from forming the basis for a criminal con-
viction. 
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III. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT AT TRIAL THAT THE ACCIDENT 
WAS THE RESULT OF CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT RATHER 
THAN INTENTIONAL CONDUCT IS INHERENTLY IMPROB-
ABLE AND SUBJECT TO REASONABLE DOUBT AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW. 
As Mrs. DeSeelhorst noted in her opening brief, see Brief of Appellant, at 18-24, 
the State did not provide an account of the accident that is consistent with its charge of 
criminal negligence or the evidence which it presented to the jury supporting that charge. 
According to the State, Mrs. DeSeelhorst saw Ms. Johnson riding in her lane several sec-
onds before the accident; Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle traveled in an straight line before, 
during, and after the accident; Ms. Johnson was struck by the exact center of Mrs. De-
Seelhorst's vehicle; the right-hand tires of Mrs. DeSeelhorst's vehicle were on the right-
hand edge of the highway at the time of the accident; and there was no evidence of brak-
ing. 
One explanation for the accident that is consistent with the State's account of the 
accident is that Mrs. DeSeelhorst saw Ms. Johnson riding in her lane, aimed her vehicle 
at Ms. Johnson, and ran her down. That explanation, however, is inconsistent with the 
State's charge of criminally negligent homicide; indeed, the State repeatedly denied that 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst was even reckless in hitting Mrs. Johnson, let alone that she did so in-
tentionally. See Brief for Appellant, at 13 & n.5. Instead, the State argued at trial that 
Mrs. DeSeelhorst saw the cyclist and then for unknown reasons "cut the corner." 
The State's explanation is simply not a believable one. It is simply ludicrous to 
suggest that a 66 year-old women with an unblemished driving record, who was familiar 
with the road and always drove in the right lane because she never went fast enough to 
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pass anyone, and who was driving five to ten miles per hour under the speed limit at the 
time of the accident, would drive directly into a cyclist in her lane by taking her vehicle 
off of a paved highway and onto the unpaved shoulder rather than using an available 
passing lane. There is no evidence in the record that this is what Mrs. DeSeelhorst at-
tempted to do. 
The only credible explanation of the accident that is consistent with the evidence 
was offered by Dr. Foley, that Mrs. DeSeelhorst suffered a brief loss of consciousness as 
the result of a partial complex seizure or other similar neurological event caused by her 
medical condition. The State attempts to show that Dr. Foley was unsure of his diagno-
sis, and that the jury rejected his medical explanation because of this lack of certainty, by 
quoting this portion of his testimony: 
Dr. Foley: And my feeling is that she is, no question, at a very high risk of 
having suffered a recurrent small stroke, mini stroke, or a partial complex 
seizure which would have rendered her unable to take appropriate action at 
a critical juncture. 
Defense Attorney: And to what degree of certainty can you give us that 
opinion, Doctor? 
Dr. Foley: Well, I think that—that to a—I mean I can't—well, to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty . . . . 
Brief of Appellee, at 19. 
The State's selective quotation of Dr. Foley's testimony shows a regrettable lack 
of candor. Dr. Foley's entire response shows that he was, indeed, quite certain of his di-
agnosis and explanation: 
Dr. Foley: Well, I think that—that to a—I mean I can't—well, to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty, / think that, given all of the facts in this 
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case that I have been able to review, including her examination, her MRIs, 
the police reports, the lack of braking-we haven't really talked about the 
physical features—it all—it all makes complete sense to me, in a lady who 
is at a very high risk for having an event like this, that she suffered a 
probably reasonably brief but critical lapse in consciousness for a short 
period of time. (R. 153, 470 (emphasis added).) 
The State's obligation at trial was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the evi-
dence supported its charge of criminal negligence. The jury's verdict relies on a determi-
nation that Mrs. DeSeelhorst, seeing the cyclist but not intending to hit her, inexplicably 
drove her car directly into her. This explanation is illogical, especially in the absence of 
any evidence of other blameworthy conduct which created an unreasonable risk of seri-
ous bodily injury or death. At the same time, the jury rejected Dr. Foley's alternative ex-
planation that is consistent with the evidence. Under these circumstances, Mrs. DeSeel-
horst submits that the State's inability to put the evidence together to tell a story that 
makes any sense leaves reasonable doubt as a matter of law as to whether Mrs. DeSeel-
horst was criminally negligent in causing the accident. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant requests that this court reverse the conviction 
in this case. 
DATED this l^/day of January, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
N:\22301\1\RRP\REPLY BRIEF.DOC: 1/17/07 
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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